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[L. A. No. 26196.

In Dank.

May 21, 1962.]

Estate of JACK ROBBINS, Deceased. IRVINE ROBBINS,
as Administrator with the Will Annexed, Petitioner and
Appellant, v. LEE MISHKIN, Claimant and Respondent.
[1] Charities-Charitable Trusts-Validity.-A testamentary trust
providing that income of the trust, or as much of the principal
as in the sole discretion of the trustees would be deemed necessary or advisable, was to be used for the care and support of
minor Negro children whose father or mother had been imprisoned as a result of a crime or misdemeanor of a political
nature was a valid charitable trust.
[2] ld.-Charitable Trusts-Requisites.-A bequest is charitahle if
it is made for a charitable purpose, its aims and accomplishments are of religious, ed ucational, political or general social
interest to mankind, and the ultimate recipients constitute
either the community as a whole or an unascertainable and
indefinite portion thereof.
[3] ld.-Charitable Trusts-Validity.-A testamentary provision
for the "care, comfort, support, medical attention, education,
sustenance, maintenance or custody" of minor children who
have been deprived of normal home life by the incarceration
of one or both of their parents is unquestionably of social
value so as to constitute the basis for a valid charitable trust.
Any risk that a parent might be induced to commit a crime
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Charities, § 32 et seq.; Am.Jur., Charities,
§ 12 et seq.
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Ch arities, §§ 2, 3; Am.Jur., Charities, § 4.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 7, 8] Charities, § 3; [2] Charities,
§ 2; [4] Charities, § 25; [5] Charities, § 19; [6] Charities, § 1.

May

1!JG~]

ESTATE OF ROBBINS

719

[51 C.2d 118; 21 Cal.Rptr. 191. 311 P .2d 513]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

he otherwise would not cOllallit because of the possibility that
his child might become a beneficiary of the trust is far outweighed by the interests of the innocent children involved
and society's intercst in them.
ld.-Beneficiaries.-By providing that income of a testamentary trust, or as much of the principal as in the sole discretion
of the trustees would be deemed necessary or advisahle, wns
to be used for the care and support of minor Negro children
whose father or mother had been imprisoned as a result of a
crime or misdemeanor of a political nature, the testator
selected a class of beneficiaries constituting an indefinite part
of the community and provided adequate standards to guide
his trustees in administering the trust. These children required special care and attention, and it was immaterial thaI
the beneficiaries were not limited to children in financial need.
ld.-Benefit not to Relieve Poverty.-R elief of proverty is not
a condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred
has a sulileiently widespread social value, a charitable purpose
exists.
Id.-Definition.--As commonly understood in modern usage,
"charity" does not refer only to aid to the poor and destitute
and exclude all humanitarian activities which are maintained
to care for the physical and mental well-being of the r ecipients,
and which make it less likely that such recipients will become
burdens on society.
ld.-Charitable Trnsts-Validity.-It is the purpose for which
property is to be used, not the motives of the testator, that
determines whether a testamentary trust is a valid charitable
trust.
ld.-Charitable Trusts--Validity.-Assistnnce to the minor
beneficiaries of a testamentary trust providing that income
of the trust, or as much of the principal as in the sole discretion of the trustces would be deemed necessary or advisable, was to be used for the care and support of minor Negro
children whose father or mother had been imprisoned as a
result of a crime or misdemeanor of a political nature was
for a valid charitahle purpose. The risk that such assistance
might sen-e to encourage crime was far more remote than thnt
which the Legislature might have created by provision for the
care of children that extends to those of convicted prisoners,
and the benefit to society offered by the testator transcended
whatever criticism there might be of his motives, which died
with him.

[4J See Cal.Jur.2d, Charities, § 48; Am.Jur., Charities, § 28 et
seq.
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APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Allgel,~s
County determining a testamentary trust to be invalid amI
denying a new trial. Harold W. Schweitzer, Judge. Ordf!l'
determining iuvalidity of trust, reversed; appeal from other
order dismissed.
Brock, Fleishman & Rykoff and Hugh R. 1!anes for Petitioner and Appellant.
John T. McTernan, David B. Finkel, A. L. Wirin and Fred
B. Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Appellant.
Pacht, Ross, Warne & Bernhard, Clore Warne, Harvey M.
Grossman and Ira E. Bilson for Claimant and Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J .-In his will the testator divided his estate
into Fund A consisting of "cash, securities and money in the
bank" and Fund B consisting of "a parcel of real estate
situated in Los Angeles, California, and improved with two
(2) single family residences, together with furniture, fixtures,
personal belongings and library contained therein." He
directed that the assets comprising Fund B be sold and the
cash distributed to three named trustees in trust. "The income
of said trust, or so much of the principal as in the sole discretion of the Trustees may be deemed desirable or advisable,
is to be used for the care, comfort, support, medical attention,
education, sustenance, maintenance or custody of such minor
Negro child or children, whose father or mother, or both, have
been incarcerated, imprisoned, detained or committed in any
federal, state, county or local prison or penitentiary, as a
result of the conviction of a crime or misdemeanor of a political nature." He then set forth illustrative examples of crimes
of a political nature for the guidance of the trustees in the
exercise of their discretion and stated his reasons for creating
the trust. l
>" In order to clarify my intention and make clear to my Trustees
what I mean or intend to be meant by crimes or misdemeanor of a
political nature, the following examples are offered for the guidance of
my Trustees:
"1. The prosecution, conviction ana incarceration resulting from a
purported ,iQ)ation of any federal, state or local statute, ordinance or
regulation, seeking to proscribe, limit, abolish, enjoin or regulate the
teaching, advising, adopting, ad,ocating or implementing any political,
geopolitical, or social·political doctrine, thesis, theory or philosophy, or
speaking or writing in support thereof . I cite the Smith Act of the
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In this proceeding to determine heirship (Prob. Code,
§ 1080) the di::;position of Fund .A is not in dispute, but Lee
Mishkin, a grandnephew of the testator, challenges the validity
of the Fund B trust. The trial court determined that the trust
is invalid. Since the will contained no residuary clause, the
court entered an order determining that the property bequeathed to the trustees should pass by the law of intestate
succession. The administrator-with-the-will-annexed appeals.
[1] We agree with the contention of the administrator
that the testator established a valid charitable trust. The
trustees, the beneficiaries, and the trust purpose are all stated.
Federal Go,ernment and the prosecutions resulting thereunder as an
example of this paragraph.
"2. The prosecution, conviction and incarceration resulting from any
contempt citation arising out of the refusal to answer any question or
questions concerning the religious, social, economic or political opinions,
beliefs, persuasions or affiliations, past and present, as may be propounded
by any fed eral, state or local committee or sub-committee, or by any
legislative committee of any state or municipality or of the Congress
of the United States. I cite the appearances before the Un-American
Activities Committee or the Internal Securities Committee of the United
States Congress and subsequent prosecutions flowing therefrom as appro·
priate exnmples of this paragraph.
"3. The prosecution, conviction and incarceration resulting from the
refusal to execute any affidavit, certification or other statement, whether
under oath, or not under oath, requiring [sic] into the political affiliations,
heliefs or association of the affiant; or the prosecution, conviction or
incarceration which may result from the execution of a purported false
statement, aflida.,-it or certification as to the past or present political
affiliations, beliefs or associations of the affiant. I cite the prosecutions
und er the non-Communist affida.,-it of the Taft-Hartley Act, or the prosecutions flowing from the McCarron-Walters Immigration Act, or the
prosecutions and proceedings filed under the so -caUed Broyle's Bill of
the State of Illinois, or prosecutions pursued by the Un-American
Acti,-ities Committees of the .,-arious states as appropriate examples
of this paragraph_
"4_ The prosecution, conviction and incarceration resulting from any
activity in the organization, or assisting in the organization, of any trade
union movement; or from the violation of any injunction of any court,
restraining, enjoining or limiting in any way the activities of any union
of working men and women in the United States, or restricting and limit·
ing the right to collectively bargain or go out on strike_
"The above examples are cited for illustration purposes only, so as
to enable and .assist my said Trustees to determine what, in their own
collecti.,-e opinion, shall constitute a crime or misdemeanor of a political
nature, in accordance with the uses and purposes of this trust_ It is
my intention, howe"er, and I do by these presents vest in my said
Trustees the full and complete power and authority to determine accord·
ing to their sole and best judgment what is now, or what in the future
may constitute, con"iction of a crime or misdemeanor of a political
nature_ I am aware and cognizant that the law is an ambulatory institution and accordingly is subject to constant change_ I anticipate that
subsequent to the execution of these presents or subsequent to the date
of my demise, laws, statutes and regulations, other than those presently
in full force and effect, may be adopted by the Congress of the United
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[2] "A bequest is charitable if: (1) It is made for a
charitable purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of religions, educational, political or general social interest to mankind. [Citations.] (2) The ultimate recipients con stitute
either the community as a whole or an unascertainable and
indefinite portion thereof. [Citations.]" (Estatc of H cnde1'son, 17 Ca1.2d 853, 857 [112 P.2d 605]. ) [3] Provision for
States or by the respecti,e legisl::ttures of the se,eral states, which will
~r may be calculated to limit, abolish or circumscribe the field of activity
in unorthodox or unpopular polit ical or economic causes or philosophies;
and that people will Le arrested, convicted and imprisoned as a result
t.herefrom. Accordingly, and with full cognizance of this eventuality,
I herehy endow my said TruBt ees, in their sole discretion an,l in accordance with their best collectiye judgment, to determine who shall r eceive
the benefits of this trust estate. :r,ry only stipulation to my said Trustees
is that the r ecipients be the minor ~egro children of such defendants . . . .
"I am aware of the unusual aml unorthodox pro, is ions in this testament generally, and particularly with regard to the creation of the trust
estate, and the purposes and uses for which it is created. 1:northodoxy
or lack of conformity ha,e never been a deterrent or governing factors
in my life. They shall play ' no governing or deterring role in my death
or in the disposition of my estate arter death. Nevertheless, somc small
word or mention should be made by way of explaining the rea sons and
hasis for the creation of the trust estate set forth herein and created
hereby.
"I have ahvays believed in the full, complete and unabridged freedom
of expression in a democratic society, including (but not limited to)
freedom to write, freed om to espouse and freedom to advocnte. To limit
these freeuoms to the majority, or to confine these fr.;edoms to the
protagonists of the orthodox or popular, is to negate or abolish the whole
democratic concept of freedom of e:.:pression; for in the final analysis, the
majority, the orthodox and the conformists have no need for this legal
immunity or protection-they already have it . It is the minority, the
unpopular, the advocate of the unorthodox who requires nnd who must
have the unahridged and inalienahle right to differ and be heard .
,. In my lifetime, I have, from time to time, been associated and
nffiliated with causes, campaigns, beliefs and organizations ad,ocating
or espousing unorthodox or un popular roncept s, and I have livcd to see
many of these coneepts and philosophies accep ted and h eralded many
years later as part of thc sorinl, politicnl and economic progress of Ollr
society, fully accepted and recognized as naturnl and respectable con·
comitants of the dcmocratic processes. Yet during the early struggles
on uehnlf of th cs e .nme canseS or bcliefs, men and women were perse·
<'atetl, os tracize d nnll somd illl es jailed, and their fnmilks left destitute
nnd devoid of allmcans of sllpport nnd maintenance. I ha,e learned from
a long line of such experiences that thcrc nre occns;ons when to differ
or to dissent may well place one's own security and the security of one's
f~lllil~' in jeopardy: However, I have nlso lcnrncd thnt irresprcti,e of
this .ieopnr,ly. certnin brn'-~ an,l intrepid men and women will always
ia, ;st OIl heing hea rd, their personnl security notwithstanding.
"It is Leca use 1 wish to presen'C the right to dissent, the right to
c1i~er :md to he different, that I havc created the trust estnte set up in
this will. It is my la st contribution to a more democratic way of life for
all people.
"'1' 1Ie right to disagree, thc right to dis5ent, the right to be different,
these are wnrp nnd "oof of the f~. ),ric of demoerncy, they are the fertilizers that feed and nurture the tree of liberty and freedom."

?lray
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thc "l:arc, com fo rt, support, medical attention, education, sustcnance, mainteuallce or custody" of minor children who have
becn deprived of normal home life by th e incarceration of one
or both of their parents is unquestionably of social value.
Any risk that a parent might be induced to commit a crime he
oth cnri:;e would not commit because of the possibility that
his thild might bccome a bcneficiary of this trust is far outweigh ed by the intcrests of the innocent children involved
and socicty's interest in them. To hold othcrwise would, as
stated in another context, "incorporate into the law of the
land, as legal precepts, the sayings that the sins of fathers are
visited upon their children (W estbrook v. Railroad, 66 Miss.
loco cit. 569 [6 So. 321, 14 Am .St.Rep. 587]), and that the
child's teeth must be set on edge because the father has eaten
sour grapes. ( B . & I. Ra1'lroad CO. V. Snyd er, 18 Ohio St.
loc o cit. 409 [98 Am .Dce. 175])." (N eff V. City of Cameron,
213 Mo. 350, 3GO [111 S .W . 1139] ; see also Zm'zana v. N eve
Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32, 34-37 [179 P. 203, 15 A .L.R. 401] ;
R eynolds V. Willson, 51 CaJ.2d 94, 102 [331 P .2d 48].)
[ 4] The t estator selected a class of beneficiarics constituting an indefinite part of the community and provided
adequate standards to guide his trust ees in administering the
trust. (Estate of BU1!Jl, 33 Cal.2d 897, 901-904 [206 P.2d
635], and authorities cited.) Like the aged beneficiaries in
Estate of H endel'son, supra, 17 Cal.2d 853, Fl'edericka Home
for the Aged v. C011nty of San Diego, 35 CaJ.2d 789 [221 P .2d
68], and Estate of Tarrant, 38 Cal.2d 42 [237 P.2d 505, 28
A.L .R.2d 419], these children require spec ial care and attention, and it is immaterial that the bcneficiaries are not limited
to children in financial need. [ 5 ] "Relief of pOYerty is not
a condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred
has a sufficiently widespread social value, a charitable purpose exists." (E state of Henderson, S11pra, 17 Ca1.2d 853,
857; see also Estate of Tarrant, supra, 38 Cal.~d 42, 50. )
[6] "In short, as the word' charity' is commonly understood in model'll usage, it does not refer only to aid to the
poor and destitute aud exclude all humanitarian activities
.. . which are maintain ed to care fo~ the physical and mental
Iycil-being of the ree:ipients, and which make it less likely that
such recipients will become burdens on society." (Fredericka
Home for the Aged v. County of San Diego, S1lpra, 35 Ca1.2d
789,793.)
Lee Mishkin contends, however, that the testator's purpose
was to encourage the commission of political crimes and that
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therefore the trust is illegal. The admiuistrator and amici
curiae contend, on the contrary, that the testator's purpose
was to encourage constitutionally protected freedom of speech
and expression and to protect the right of lawful dissent and
that these are valid charitable purposes. They contend that
the illustrations the testator set forth in his will, convictioIls
of violating the Smith Act, convictions of contempt of congressional committees, convictions for violating laws dealing
with test oaths, convictions for engaging in labor-union activities, all involve areas where the lines between constitutionally
protected activity and illegal activity are vaguely defined.
(Cf., e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857,
95 L.Ed. 1137], with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
[77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L .Ed.2d 1356]; Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 [81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782], with Nota v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 [81 S.Ct. 1517, 6 L .Ed.2d 836] ;
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 [79 S.Ct. 1081,
3 L.Ed.2d 1115], with N.A .A .C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
[78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488].) They assert that the will can
reasonably be interpreted as referring only to parents who
have been unlawfully convicted for engaging in constitutionally protected activity and that thereby any question of
illegality can be avoided.
We need not search for any such limitation in the language
of the will to sustain the trust. We may assume that the
testator intended to benefit the children of those convicted
of even valid laws of which he disapproved and that his
motive in part at least was to encourage challenges to such
laws by violations of them. [7] It is the purpose for which
the property is to be used, however, not the motives of the
testator that determines whether a trust is a valid charitable
trust. (Estate of Bntin, 81 Cal.App.2d 76, 83 [183 P.2d 304] ;'
Matt er of Frasch, 245 N.Y. 174, 182 [156 N.E. 849]; Archambault's Estate, 308 Pa. 549, 555 [162 A. 801]; Woodstown
Nat. Bank &- Tmst Co. v. Snelbaker, 136 N.J.Eq. 62 [40 A.2d
222, 224], affd., 133 N.J.L. 256 [44 A.2d 210]; Jackson v.
Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 568-569; see Estate of
Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 434-435 [175 P .2d 524] ; In re Little's
Estate, 403 Pa. 534 [170 A .2d 106, 107-108] ; Chamberlain v.
Van Horn, 246 Mass. 462, 464 [141 N.E. 111]; Baker v.
Hickman, 127' Kan . 340 [273 P. 480, 481, 68 A.L.R. 743] ;
Rest. 2d Trusts, § 368, com. d; 4 Scott on Trusts [2d ed.]
§§ 348, 368, pp. 2551, 2628; 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,
§ 364, pp. 30-34.)

)
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[8] Assistance to the minor beneficiaries of the trust in
this case is a valid charitable purpose. The risk that sueh
assistance may serve to encourage crime is far more remote
than that which the Legislature itself may have created by
provision for the care of children that extends to those of
convicted prisoners. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1500.) The
benefit to society offered by the testator transcends whatever
criticism there may be of his motives, which have died with
him.
The order is reversed. The appeal from the order denying
the motion for new trial is dismissed. (Prob. Code, § 1240;
Estate of Duke, 41 Cal.2d 509, 515-516 [261 P.2d 235] .)
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J ., and Dooling, J., concurred.
WHITE, J .- I dissent.
Undoubtedly a valid trust may be created where its purposes are to effect changes in existing laws. (See 4 Scott on
Trusts [2d ed.] § 374.4, p. 2677; 2A Bogert on Trusts, § 378,
pp. 168-170.)
As was said by this court in Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641,
650-651 [266 P. 526] ; "The trend of modern authority has
been toward the upholding of trusts which have for their
object the creation of a more enlightened public opinion,
with a consequent change in laws having to do with human
relations and rights in a republic such as ours . . . . To hold
that a change in a law is in effect an attempt to violate that
law would discourage improvement in legislation and tend
to compel us to continue indefinitely to live under laws designed for an entirely different state of society. Such view
is opposed to every principle of our government based on the
theory that it is a government 'of the people, by the people
and for the people,' and fails to recognize the right of those
who make the laws to change them at their pleasure when
circumstances seem to require. With the wisdom of the proposed change the courts are not concerned."
However, recognition cannot be given to a trust as valid
where its purpose is illegal. Therein lies the vice of the trust
now engaging our attention. It not only encourages but offers
an inducement for violation of the criminal law. In the Restatement of Trusts is found the following cogent statement:
"A tru st lvltich t(' nds to induce a breach of the criminal law
is invalid. Thus, a trust of property to be applied to the
paymf'lIt of fine:'; or pr rsons convicted of criminal offenses . . .
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is invalid. " (Emphasis added.) And in 4 Scott on Trusts
(2d ed.) section 377 at page 2729, it is said: "A trust cannot
be creatcd for a purpose which is illegal. The purpose is
illegal if the trust property is to be med for an object which
is ill violation of the criminal law, or if the trust tends to
induce the commission of crime, or if the accomplishment of
the purpose is otherwise against public policy. Questions of
public policy are not fixed and unchanging, but vary from
time to time and from place to place. A trust fails for illegality if the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust is
regarded as against public policy in the community in which
the trust is created and at the time whcn it is created. Wherc
a po/·i cy is articulated in a statlltc making certain conduct II
a criminal offcnse, then, of C01lrse, a trllst is illegal if its performance involves sllch criminal cond1lct, or if it tends to encourage such conduct. Thus, in an early English case a bequest to trustees' to make seats for poor people to beg in by
the highway' was held invalid since such begging was a
criminal offense.
"A trust is illegal, even if it does not involve the performance of an illegal act by the trustees, if the natural result of
the performance of the trust would be to induce the commission of crime. Thus a bequest to purchase the release of
persons committed to prison for nonpayment of fines under
the game laws was held illegal." (Emphasis added.)
In my opinion, it would do violence to reason and challenge
credulity to say that the object of the trust with which we
are here concerned is to bring about a change in the law by
lawful and orderly means. On the contrary the testator,
,,·ith care and precision, under·took to instruct his trustees
that those who would violate certain named existing penal
statutes, or commit any crime or misdemeanor which the
testator terms "of a political nature," and is convicted
thereof, were to be rewarded by the furnishing of aid to their
<:hildren. That the trust I)l'Operty in the case at bar was to
be used in the performance of the trust to encourage if not
induce the commission of crime, to me seems manifest, and
therefore, consonant with the foreg-oing reasoning and authorities, it cannot be held to be a valid charitable trust.
I would affirm the judgment.
Schauer, J.,_ and McComb, .J., concurred.

